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APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994):
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action . . . and/or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment.
REBUTTAL FACTS
1.

As an illustration of Ms. Dennison7s disregard for

the actual facts herein and contrary to her assertion on pg. 2 of
her brief, Ms. Dennison knew why the payments from Mr. Hammond
had ceased at least one month before she filed her motion on
March 26, 1993.
2.

(R. 628-629).

The essence of the transaction pursuant to which

Mr. Hammond loaned $25,000.00 to Mr. Orr was so that Mr. Orr
could exercise an option on land for which he had a buyer.

The

shares of stock were only additional incentive to Mr. Hammond.
(R. 723-724).
3.

There is no evidence in the record to support Ms.

Dennison's allegation in her brief that it was never agreed,
discussed or implied that Mr. Hammond would have the right to
encumber the HHEICO contract.

Her references in paragraph 6 of

her statement of facts do not provide any such support.
4.

Contrary to the statements in paragraph 7 of the

statement of facts, Mr. Hammond's testimony was that Ms. Dennison
did not have an interest in the HHEICO contract.

1

(R. 736) .

5.

The amount of $262,951.41 referred to in paragraph

11 of the statement of facts is misleading as it is a gross
balance which includes amounts owing on other senior obligations
which had to be paid before arriving at the net proceeds.

(R.

636-637 and 649-650).
6.

Additionally, in said paragraph the Decree of

Divorce is mischaracterized.

The decree only awarded to Ms.

Dennison 65% of the net proceeds.
7.

(R. 271-272).

Paragraph 12 of the statement of facts

mischaracterizes the document at pg. 383 of the record.

The

document thereat states that $51,509.37 is the present value of
218 months of payments in the amount of $505.05.
8.

(R. 383).

Paragraph 14 of the statement of facts is an

assertion of Ms. Dennison's counsel and not a statement contained
anywhere in the record.
9.

The amount of $110,100.90 as an amount Ms. Dennison

lost relies upon a statement by the trial court which is contrary
to the evidence.

It assumes, with no factual basis, that there

would be 218 future payments of $505.05.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Post judgment civil contempt orders are appealable

as a matter of right.

Furthermore, orders which have been

certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are appealable as a matter of right.
II.

Ms. Dennison relies solely upon paragraph 7,

however, paragraph 7 does not in any manner forbid Mr. Hammond
2

from selling, transferring or otherwise encumbering the HHEICO
contract and it does not command Mr. Hammond to obtain the
consent of Ms. Dennison before dealing with the HHEICO contract.
Mr. Hammond testified that his understanding was that he always
has had the right to sell or transfer said contract and that Ms.
Dennison never has had any interest in the HHEICO contract at any
time.
Ms. Dennison has not presented any evidence to
contradict Mr. Hammond's showing of a lack of ability to comply
with any court order.
Findings of Fact No. 10 and No. 11 do not provide any
support for the trial court's ruling.
III.

There is insufficient evidence to support the

trial court's order as an award of damages.

Said order is a

modification of the Decree of Divorce which exceeds the power of
the trial court in the proceeding before the court.
IV.

Critical evidence regarding the value of the

HHEICO contract was missing at the time of Mr. Hammond's motion
to dismiss.

Ms. Dennison fails to provide any reference to any

such evidence and, accordingly, Mr. Hammond's motion to dismiss
should have been granted.
V.

No evidence of reasonableness was presented at the

second hearing for which attorney's fees were awarded.

The fee

arrangement at the second hearing was an hourly arrangement
rather than the flat fee arrangement which existed at the time of
the first hearing.

Accordingly, there is no evidence to support
3

the trial court's conclusion of law regarding reasonableness of
the amount of fees for the services provided after the first
hearing.

Since Mr. Hammond is not in contempt, Ms. Dennison

should not have been awarded any attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ENTERED ON DECEMBER
13, 1994 IS APPEALABLE.
Appellee, Ms. Dennison, relies upon Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) for its sole authority that the
order entered on December 13, 1994 is not appealable.

However,

Ms. Dennison does not in any manner address the position of the
Utah Supreme Court stated therein as follows:
On occasion, we have treated an order of civil contempt
as final and appealable. See, e.g., Bradshaw v.
Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981); Thomas v. Thomas,
569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977); Snow v. Snow, 13 Utah 15, 43
P. 620 (1896). In Bradshaw, Thomas, and Snow, the
contempt orders arose out of supplemental proceedings
after a final judgment; therefore, it was unlikely that
any subsequent judgment would be entered from which an
appeal could be taken.
Id. at 1167 n. 3.

All of the quotes in Ms. Dennison's brief

refer to prejudgment civil contempt orders.

In the instant case

the ruling of the trial court entered on December 13, 1994 arose
out of Ms. Dennison's post judgment Order to Show Cause.

No

subsequent judgment will be entered except as to other issues as
raised pursuant to the trial court's continuing jurisdiction of a
domestic matter.
In Thomas the appeal was from a civil contempt order
entered in a domestic matter pursuant to a post judgment order to
show cause.

The instant case is the same procedural setting.
4

Accordingly, as in Bradshaw, Thomas and Snow, the ruling of the
trial court is appealable as a matter of right.
Additionally, in Von Hake the Utah Supreme Court
noted that "an order finding one guilty of criminal contempt is
generally considered to be a final order separate from any
ongoing proceedings and appealable as a matter of right". Von
Hake, 759 P.2d at 1167. On the other hand an order regarding
civil contempt during prejudgment civil proceedings is treated
the same as any other order entered during the course of civil
proceedings.

Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(1994) provides the procedure to appeal said orders as a matter
of right and states as follows:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action . . . and/or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the instant case such an express determination was
made by the trial court that there was no just reason for delay
and an express direction that the order entered on December 13,
1994 was a final appealable order.

(R. 615-616).

Ms. Dennison

neglected to inform the Court of this proceeding or to address
the effect of said proceeding.

On the basis of this proceeding

alone, the order entered on December 13, 1994 is appealable as a
matter of right.

5

II.

MR. HAMMOND IS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF ANY COURT ORDER.

A. The Decree of Divorce does not impose a duty by its language
to not sell, transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract.
U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) and Estate of Manfield, 856 P.2d 1056
(Utah 1993) are irrelevant to the issues before the Court.

There

is no issue herein regarding the court's power to divide the
marital estate upon divorce.
Ms. Dennison's assertions that she became the owner of
65% of the proceeds of the HHEICO contract and that she held a
majority interest in the HHEICO contract are wrong and there was
no evidence of the value of an award of 65% of the net proceeds.
(Brief of Appellee at 12).

The trial court acknowledged that Ms.

Dennison was not an owner of the HHEICO contract when it
prevented her from testifying as to its value based upon an
objection that she had no ownership interest therein.

(R. 694-

695) . Ms. Dennison was awarded "65% of the net proceeds of the
HHEICO contract".

(R. 271). The net proceeds can only be the

amount of money which Mr. Hammond had left, of that which he had
received pursuant to the HHEICO contract, after he paid certain
obligations.

Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce created a debt

from Mr. Hammond to Ms. Dennison.
Ms. Dennison has not referred the Court to any
provision or language of the Decree of Divorce or any other order
which requires that Mr. Hammond obtain Ms. Dennison's consent
prior to selling, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the
HHEICO contract.

No such language exists. Ms. Dennison has not

referred the Court to any provision or language of the Decree of
6

Divorce or any other order which forbids Mr. Hammond from
selling, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the HHEICO
contract.

None exists.
The only provision of a court order which Ms. Dennison

relies upon is paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce.

Paragraph 7

states as follows:
The plaintiff is awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the
defendant is awarded thirty-five percent (35%) of the
net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net
proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $777.00 per.(sic)
The plaintiff is entitled to receive $505.05 per month
and the defendant is entitled to receive $271.95 per
month from the HHEICO contract. In the event that the
net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall
differ from the $777.00 per month, then the parties
shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent (65%)
to the plaintiff and thirty-five percent (35%) to the
defendant.
There is no language therein forbidding Mr. Hammond to sell,
encumber or otherwise deal with the HHEICO contract, no language
awarding an ownership interest to Ms. Dennison and no requirement
to obtain her consent.

Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce

specifically contemplates the situation wherein the net amount
received from the HHEICO contract is other than $777.00 per
month, such as the sale or other transfer, and provides that Ms.
Dennison shall receive 65% of the net amount received.
Restrictions could easily have been placed upon Mr.
Hammond if it had been so intended.

Said restrictions must be

there explicitly in order to create a known duty, which did not
previously exist, to not sell, transfer, assign or encumber said
contract.
7

If there is no command, there is no disobedience. A
person may not be held in contempt of court for
violating an order, unless the terms of the order are
definite, certain and specific.
Goodover v. Lindey's Inc., 847 P.2d 699, 701 (Mont. 1993).
Furthermore, Ms. Dennison does not refer this Court to
any evidence at all that Mr. Hammond understood that he was
restricted from selling, transferring or encumbering the
contract.

The only evidence referred to by Ms. Dennison is that

Mr. Hammond had knowledge of paragraph 7 of the Decree of
Divorce.

(Brief of Appellee at 15).

There is no evidence or

support for Ms. Dennison's allegation in her brief that it was
never agreed, discussed or implied that Mr. Hammond would have
the right to encumber the HHEICO contract.
Mr. Hammond testified that his understanding was that
he always has had the right to sell or transfer said contract.
He testified that it was his understanding that Ms. Dennison did
not have any interest in the HHEICO contract at any time.
693, 736, 745-746 and 755-756).

(R.

There is no controverting

testimony.
B. Mr. Hammond did not have the ability to comply with the court
order and did not willfully and knowingly refuse to comply with
the order.
The only evidence that Ms. Dennison sets forth to show
that she met her burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Mr. Hammond had the ability to comply with the
court order is some testimony by Mr. Hammond wherein he
acknowledges that he could rent an apartment at a cost of $650.00
per month.

Ms. Dennison tries to imply that Mr. Hammond could
8

have used his portion of the HHEICO proceeds and other money then
being spent on a house payment to find other housing and, thus,
he had the ability to pay Ms. Dennison.

Said implication fails

because Ms. Dennison failed to show that the money Mr. Hammond
was receiving from the HHEICO contract was not the same money
being used to pay his portion of the house payment.

No other

evidence is presented by Ms. Dennison to support her burden or to
rebut the testimony of Mr. Hammond regarding his financial
condition and that he did not have the ability to pay Ms.
Dennison her portion of the proceeds.
Ms. Dennison relies upon Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d
1119 (Utah 1977) to claim that by she has met her burden by
showing that there is a judgment and failure to comply with said
judgment.

However, Ms. Dennison fails to address the

requirements stated immediately following the language which she
quotes to the Court which is as follows:
But where there is evidence concerning justification
for the failure, the ultimate burden of proving that
the party charged is in contempt is on the complainant.
. . .

Under what we regard as a view more enlightened
than prevailed in former times, the mere failure to pay
a debt or meet an obligation is not punishable by
imprisonment.
Id. at 1121.

In the instant case evidence was presented

concerning justification for the acts of Mr. Hammond which
included evidence of unemployment, his financial condition and
that he was providing the sole support for the minor children.
(R. 646, 648, 653-654, 690-691, 720-721 and 729).

Accordingly,

the burden remains upon Ms. Dennison to show all three elements
9

of contempt as set forth in Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v.
Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988) and to meet the burden she must
show more than there is a judgment and a failure to comply with
said judgment.
C. The findings of the trial court are inadequate to support a
holding of contempt.
Ms. Dennison alleges that, in addition to Findings of
Fact No. 9 and No. 13, which were discussed in the Brief of
Appellant at 18-19, Findings of Fact No. 10 and 11 provide
sufficient basis for the trial court's finding of contempt.
(Brief of Appellee at 19). Finding of Fact No. 10 in essence
states that Mr. Hammond did not confer with Ms. Dennison or
obtain her consent.

Finding of Fact No. 10 does not provide any

support for a conclusion that Mr. Hammond knew of the duty
imposed by the court's order, that he had the ability to comply
with the order, or that he willfully and knowingly refused to
comply.
Finding of Fact No. 11 is an ultimate conclusion of the
trial court interpreting paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce.
It lacks supporting facts, is erroneous on its face, cannot be
supported by any evidence and is proven incorrect by the trial
court's own statements.
Finding of Fact No. 11 states: "There did not need to
be a specific provision in the decree to make clear that he was
prevented from encumbering the HHEICO contract."
above, that is clear error and contrary to law.

As explained
Furthermore, it

is an admission by the trial court that there is no command in
10

the Decree of Divorce forbidding Mr. Hammond to sell or otherwise
transfer the HHEICO contract.
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, on several
occasions during the proceedings before the trial court the trial
court stated that the Decree of Divorce did not restrict Mr.
Hammond from selling or transferring the HHEICO contract.

The

fact that the judge, after reading the Decree of Divorce, so
stated is clear, convincing proof that paragraph 7 of the Decree
of Divorce does not prevent Mr. Hammond from encumbering the
HHEICO contract.
Finally, Ms. Dennison has not presented any evidence
regarding the meaning of paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce,
other than paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce.

As explained

above, Mr. Hammond testified that he did not understand paragraph
7 of the Decree of Divorce to in any way restrict his ability to
sell, transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract.
III. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS POWER IN ORDERING
MR. HAMMOND TO REPAY MS. DENNISON AND TO SERVE 30 DAYS
IN JAIL.
This appeal is the proper time and manner to contest
the trial court's order after the evidentiary hearing. Mr.
Hammond is not required to go through any post judgment
proceedings before he can appeal the order.
The only evidence that Ms. Dennison relies upon to
justify the court's ruling as an award of damages is the monthly
amount set forth in the Decree of Divorce of $505.05 and an
amortization schedule showing that, if all payments are made in
11

the future at the amount specified in the Decree of Divorce, 218
payments would be made.

This totally ignores paragraph 7 of the

Decree of Divorce which must be followed in determining what Ms.
Dennison is entitled to recover.

It also ignores the testimony

of Mr. Poulson, the holder of the HHEICO contract, that he didn't
know if the payments would continue in the future and that the
obligor on the contract had recently changed.

(R. 764-765).

There is insufficient evidence for the trial court's
award if it is for damages.

In essence the trial court's order

is a modification of the Decree of Divorce it should be vacated
because it exceeds the power of the trial court in the
proceedings before the court.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MR.
HAMMOND'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
Ms. Dennison incorrectly characterizes the testimony in
the trial court and provides no support for her allegations.
(Brief of Appellee at 22).

Mr. Hammond testified that he sold

the HHEICO contract in order to borrow $25,000 in an attempt to
not be required to sell the home where he resided with the
parties' minor child.

(R. 744). No evidence of present value

was presented to the trial court at the time of the Mr. Hammond's
motion to dismiss.

Furthermore, evidence of present value is not

sufficient to establish the fair market value of the contract.
No evidence regarding the factors that a willing buyer considers
when purchasing such a contract or opinion as to its value was
presented.
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The other testimony relied upon by Ms. Dennison in her
brief - the gross balance of the contract and the number of
remaining payments - is insufficient to establish the value of
the HHEICO contract.

If the value is not established it is not

possible to determine whether it has been improperly discounted.
Accordingly, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom
do not establish that Ms. Dennison convincingly showed a right to
relief.

Critical evidence was missing and Mr. Hammond's motion

to dismiss should have been granted.
V. MRS. DENNISON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Ms. Dennison inaccurately states that evidence was
proffered regarding the reasonableness of the fees awarded to Ms.
Dennison.

Some evidence of reasonableness was presented at the

first hearing.

(R. 672). No evidence of reasonableness was

presented at the second hearing for which attorney's fees were
awarded.

(R. 708-709).

The fee arrangement at the second

hearing was an hourly arrangement rather than the flat fee
arrangement which existed at the time of the first hearing.
Accordingly, there is no evidence to support the trial court's
conclusion of law regarding reasonableness of the amount of fees
for the services provided after the first hearing.

Ms. Dennison

has the burden of proving the reasonableness of said fees.

Since

there is no evidence in this regard the award should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
In the instant case there was no evidence of a known
duty imposed by the court's order; the ability to comply with the
13

order; and willfully and knowingly refusing to comply with said
order.

The simple existence of the trial court's ruling on

August 11, 1993 demonstrates that the Decree of Divorce does not
impose a known duty by its language to not sell, transfer or
encumber the HHEICO contract.

Finally, the findings of the trial

court are inadequate to support its holding of contempt.
It was improper for the trial court to modify the
Decree of Divorce and it exceed its power in ordering Mr. Hammond
to make payments to Mrs. Dennison and in ordering a judgment in
the event of default. Since Mr. Hammond is not in contempt and
Mrs. Dennison did not prevail on her order to show cause, she
should not have been awarded any attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of February, 1996.

DAVID J. HODGSON
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